Major Themes in Economics
Volume 10

Article 5

Spring 2008

Has Thailand Learned from the Asian Crisis of 1997?
Kuejai Jungjaturapit
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright ©2008 by Major Themes in Economics
Recommended Citation
Jungjaturapit, Kuejai (2008) "Has Thailand Learned from the Asian Crisis of 1997?," Major Themes in
Economics, 10, 35-64.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol10/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CBA Journals at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Major Themes in Economics by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

Has Thailand Learned from the
Asian Crisis of 1997?
Kuejai Jungjaturapit
ABSTRACT. Many economists have investigated the causes of the Asian crisis of 1997 in
order to prevent a repeat of it. There were many issues leading to the crisis, and there is
no agreement on what all the causes were. I conclude that for the case of Thailand, there
were three main causes: exchange rate policy, weak financial institutions, and actions of
the government. The crisis is analyzed, and the results are used to suggest ways to prevent
future unnecessary recessions. Finally, the current situation in Thailand is examined to
determine whether Thailand has learned from the crisis and made any necessary change
to prevent a future collapse in the Thai economy.

I. Introduction
Recession is one of the most frightening words to economists, policy
makers, business owners, and the general public. The Asian crisis was an
extreme case of a recession. It was the worst recession in Thai history.
It spread across many countries in Asia and other countries around the
world. Because the crisis started in Thailand, the emphasis for this paper
is the situation in Thailand. The crisis is analyzed, and the results are
used to suggest ways to prevent future unnecessary recessions.

II. An Outline of the Crisis
A. THE BOOM BEFORE THE CRISIS
Thailand enjoyed remarkable economic development from 1987 to 1996.
GDP per capita grew at a rate of 8.17% per year. GDP measured with
PPP grew at an average of 12.62 % per year [NYU 2005]. According to
Vines and Warr, “during this decade the Thai economy was the fastest
growing in the world” [2005, 440]. Economic growth also improved
living standards in Thailand. People could afford more goods and
services. Life expectancy increased from 58 in 1970 to 69 in 1995; the
literacy rate went up from 79% to 94% from 1970 to 1995, and the
income of the poorest fifth was $726 in 1990, a 101% increase from 1970
[Radelet et al. 1998, 15 and 20].
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B. WHEN DID IT START?
Most people are under the misconception that the crisis occurred without
warning. Actually, economic growth started to fall at the end of 1995.
Figure 1 shows that growth of GDP per capita dropped from 8.61% to
5.24% that year.
Figure 1. GDP Per Capita Growth

Figure 2 breaks down GDP growth for each quarter from 1994 to 2000.
This allows us to see that the fall started in the fourth quarter of 1995. It
eventually became clear at the end of the second quarter in 1997 that the
recession had begun.
Figure 2. GDP at 1988 price (percentage change)
Year

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1994

11.26

9.17

5.09

10.31

1995

9.10

13.05

10.00

5.54

1996

4.44

1997

1.35

6.67
-0.57

7.78
-1.85

4.73
-4.58

1998

-7.57

-14.20

-13.93

1999

-0.20

3.40

8.40

6.40

6.20

2.40

4.00

2000

6.50

Source: TDRI 2007

-7.40
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Another indicator of the downturn was external short-term debt.
According to data from the Bank of International Settlements, short-term
debt increased from $27,151 million in June 1994 to $45,567 million in
June 1997, while the debt to reserves ratio increased from .992 to 1.453
during the same period [Radelet et al. 1998, 15 and 26]. This indicates
illiquidity and vulnerability in the Thai financial sector.
According to Radelet et al, the first significant evidence of the
financial problem occurred in the property market. Property prices
declined in late 1996. On 5 February 1997, Somprasong Land, a major
property developer, failed to make a payment on its foreign debt. The
bankruptcy of Somprasong Land was an indicator of trouble in the real
estate market. Every real estate company tried to get rid of on hand assets
to minimize its loss. At the same time, no investors wanted to buy these
assets, which drove down the price of properties even more. This caused
people to assume other real estate companies would go out of business.
The expectation of widespread business closings combined with the drop
in property prices to put financial companies into trouble because they
had made loans to companies in the Bangkok property market, [Radelet
et al. 1998, 27].
From late 1996 to June 1997, the Bank of Thailand spent about $39
billion in foreign exchange reserves purchasing forward contracts
defending the baht (the Thai currency) against currency speculators
[Radelet et al. 1998, 28]. Eventually, on 2 July 1997, the government
decided to let the baht float. The announcement from the Thai
government acknowledged that the Thai economy was in trouble, and it
turned out to be the worst recession in Thai history.
C. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER JULY 2, 1997?
After the announcement, people were shocked by the rapid fall of the
baht. It fell from 24.52 bahts per US dollar to 30.18 bahts per US dollar
the first day. On 12 January 1998, the Thai currency hit rock bottom at
56.10 bahts per US dollar, compared to an average in 1996 of 25.34 bahts
per US dollar [The Fed of NY]. The Thai stock market plummeted right
away. The Thai government had to borrow money from the IMF to
increase liquidity, and standby credit of $3.9 billion was approved on
August 20th, 2007 [BIS 1998, 132].
For most laypeople in Thailand, the boom economy seemed to end
dramatically. They did not know exactly what happened. Many

38

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2008

businesses went bankrupt, and people stopped spending. The news
continuously reported on national debt, describing how much each Thai
person owed on the IMF loan created by the government without
explaining why the loan was taken out in the first place
The floating of the Thai baht initially affected businesses using
foreign currency loans. The crisis caused the risk premium to increase
and eventually drove up the interest rate. The increase in the interest rate
affected everyone, not just the businesses using foreign currency loans.
The three-month interest rate in early 1997 was about 13.1%. It hit its
peak on December 25th, 2007 at 26% [BIS 1998, 136]. As shown in
Figure 3, the real short-term interest rate was more than double what it
was the year before at the end of quarter 2, causing the Thai economy to
become stagnant.
Figure 3. Short-term interest rates in real terms: alternative deflators
Deflated by:
1990-95

1996

5.1

4.7

Interest (%)
Deflated by:

Interest (%)
Source: BIS 1998, 138

Q2
10.4

Q3
12.3

Q2
10.5

Q3
6.5

year-on-year inflation
1997
1998
Q4
Q1
12.4
14.5
quarterly inflation
1997
1998
Q4
Q1
9.2
14.2

A high interest rate made it hard to invest or come up with positive net
present value projects because it made investments less profitable (See
Figure 4). In addition, many existing businesses went bankrupt due to
their inability to pay back loans, and remaining businesses had a hard
time staying solvent. Some had to layoff workers and cut spending. This
caused unemployment to rise(See Figure 5). Many employees had to take
salary cuts and forgo amenities such as bonuses. Despite the decrease in
income, employees in general were very happy to remain employed.
However, they remained fearful as to how long they would remain
employed. As a result, people decreased spending, which ended up
affecting every business, regardless of size.
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Figure 4. Investment Promotion in Thailand

Applications Approved
No. Of Approvals
Total Investment
(millions of baht)
Source: TDRI 2007

1996

1997

1998

970

919

483

531,198

481,292

254,864

Figure 5. Unemployment Rate
rate
1998

3.4

1997

0.9

1985-1996

2.41%

changes
277.80%

Source: EconStats (2004).
Acquiring data from IMF-IFS

D. THE CRISIS SPREADS
The crisis did not stop in Thailand. Shortly after the crisis broke out in
Thailand, the effect spilled over to other countries. The Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia were affected because foreign investors viewed
these economies as similar to Thailand. The Philippines peso floated on
July 11th, 1997, and dropped a total of 41.8% from July 1997 to January
1998. The Malaysian Ringgit fell by 46.3% from July 1997 to January
1998. The Indonesian rupiah floated on August 14th, 1997, and dropped
a total of 84.3% from July 1997 to January 1998. The crisis moved to
East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea. Taiwan
and Hong Kong were affected because they had loaned money to
countries in South East Asia. The Korean won floated on December 16th,
1997, and dropped a total of 54.6% from July 1997 to December 1997.
The Hong Kong market was also affected. The Hang Seng index, the
stock market index in Hong Kong, fell by 23% on October 20th-23rd, 1997.
The crisis eventually reached Russia and Latin America [BIS 1998, 132136]. The country that got hit the hardest by the Asian Crisis was the
Philippines [IMF 1997, 18].
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In many of the affected countries, governments had pegged the
exchange rate prior to the crisis. When their reserves fell below the value
of their external debt, they decided to float their currency.

III. Literature Review
Researchers have spent years analyzing the cause of the Asian crisis to
determine what exactly caused the crisis to take place. A review of this
research may help one understand the crisis from different points of view,
and putting many pieces of information together can help one see the big
picture.
The IMF concluded that the crisis occurred because of weak financial
systems due to insider dealing, corruption, and weak corporate
governance, inefficient government spending and an unstable banking
system. The situation was made worse by governments defending a
pegged exchange rate and protecting failed banking institutions.
Consequently, foreign investors started to panic after recognizing that
foreign exchange reserves were lower than the level of short-term foreign
debts [Radelet et al. 1998, 1-2].
Vines and Warr concluded that “the investment boom and its
changing composition generated record growth but also increased
macroeconomic vulnerability” [2003, 440]. The combination of
vulnerability and the decline in exports due to increased competition from
abroad caused the crisis to occur. They explained that overinvestment
occurred in domestic private investment. Overinvestment had three main
causes. The first is related to government policies, some of which were
actually supported by the IMF. The Thai Government created the
Bangkok International Banking facility (BIBF) that made it easier to
obtain foreign funds. The second cause was poor monetary policy. The
policy caused interest rates abroad to be substantially lower than the
interest rate in Thailand, which made it more attractive to borrow foreign
funds. The last cause was due to non-bank financial institutions. Before
the crisis, “banking licenses in Thailand had been highly profitable”
[Vine et al. 2003, 457]. The non-bank financial institutions were fighting
to get a license, so they competed with one another to be on top in the
domestic financial market. They borrowed a large amount of money from
abroad and lent at lower interest rates than banks. In turn, overinvestment
in domestic private investment created a large current account deficit,
which eventually caused reserve vulnerability. [Vine et al. 2003, 440-
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466].
Scott MacDonald focused on transparency. He said that a lack of
transparency and disclosure were the major catalysts to the crisis. As
economist Rudifer Dornbusch noted “With transparency, you get the right
prices and you can get the most stability” [MacDonald 1998, 689]. A
lack of transparency and disclosure amplified problems with money
politics and corruption. During the growth period, a lack of transparency
and disclosure did not seem to be a problem. When recession occurred,
a lack of transparency aggravated problems, resulting in deep recession.
MacDonald also agreed with the three main reasons mentioned by Vines
and Warr. However, MacDonald added a fourth reason - poor lending
practices by financial institutions. Loans were easily granted without
adequate review. He believed that all these problems would not have
existed if transparency had existed. There were many factors leading to
a lack of transparency in the Thai financial world. First, the Thai
tradition of patron-client relationships created informal networking. The
networking was generally based on reputation and family or ethnic
networks. The informal networking was largely used to make financial
decisions without formal procedures. A second problem was a weak legal
structure. People found loopholes in laws and got away with illegal
actions. This included an abusive use of power, especially by public
officers and governors. A lack of transparency played a big role not only
during the growth period but also during the crisis. For instance,
investors used informal networking to get away from deep losses through
informal networking and bribery [MacDonald 1998, 688-702].
Jim Glassman looked at the crisis in a different way. He wrote that
the main cause of the crisis was the decline of profitability of
manufacturing caused by global export competition and over-capacity.
He showed that manufacturing profit rates continually declined since
1990. It was clear that Thailand lost market share in export markets to
other countries, especially China. During the boom period, all other
Asian countries were expanding at the same time. Unfortunately,
exporting seemed to be the only way to expand profit because the
domestic market was not growing fast enough. The Asian countries were
also focusing on exporting similar products to the same markets such as
Japan and the US. Furthermore, Thailand put very little focus on
technology advancement. In the mid 1990s, Thailand had only 0.2
research and development scientists and technicians per 1000 Thai
population, which was a significantly lower ratio than in South Korea
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(2.9), Singapore (2.6), China (0.6), and even Vietnam (0.3). Thus, Thai
firms competed with others by focusing on low labor costs, rather than
high productivity. Consequently, Thai workers’ standard of living
increased at a lower rate than others, so the consumption power in the
country remained low. So while other countries had no boundary to how
much they could expand, Thailand could only lower its labor costs so
much [Glassman 2001, 122-147].
Paul Krugman said that there are several possible causes of the Asian
crisis. However, he believed that the two most important reasons were
severe moral hazard problems and the overpricing of assets. First, he
suggested moral hazard largely occurred in financial institutions. Most
foreign creditors of financial institutions believed that the Thai
government guaranteed the financial institutions. The assumption led
many investors to assume less responsibility toward their actions.
Krugman noted that during the boom period, investors received all the
profit, but they thought that they could walk away with no personal cost
if losses occurred. Thus, moral hazard eventually caused overinvestment
and poor investment choices. Asset overpricing also started with moral
hazard and overinvestment. Because there was too much money,
financial intermediaries tried to gain profits from speculating on assets.
Due to the moral hazard problem, investors made bidding decision based
on best case scenarios instead of expected values. Hence, assets were
overpriced. When the crisis hit, asset prices fell, causing big losses
[Krugman 1998].

IV. The Crisis in Thailand
The research above shows that the crisis was multi-faceted. In the case
of Thailand, there appears to be three main causes: exchange rate policy,
mistakes by financial institutions and businesses, and government actions.
A. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
1. Exchange Rate and Speculation
Prior to 1990, borrowing from abroad was uncommon, so the gap
between the interest rate in Thailand and the US was not important. As
foreign borrowing became more common, the decision to peg the
exchange rate left room for profit from arbitrage. For instance, the Thai
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government tried to keep the exchange rate at 25 bahts/US dollar. In
1990, investors could borrow $100 in the US at 10.01%, and lend $100
in Thailand at 14.75% (Figure 6). When the government decided to peg
the exchange rate it caused the forward rate to be the same as the spot
rate. Investors could make a profit of $4.74 without taking any risk
(100*1. 1475-100*1.1001 = $4.74). To currency speculators, this means
the expected the future spot rate should be lower, which is shown below
by using the uncovered interest parity concept.

The calculation above suggests that with these interest rates, the
exchange rate should change from 25 bahts to 26.08 bahts per dollar,
ceteris paribus.
Figure 6. Prime Rate (%)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
THA 16.08 13.38 11.54 11.59 12.27 14.75 15.40 12.23 11.16 11.05 13.17 13.75 13.06 14.51
US

9.93 8.33 8.20 9.32 10.87 10.01 8.46 6.25 6.00 7.14 8.83 8.27 8.44 8.35

Sources: Bank of Thailand and The Fed of St Louis

As the arbitrage occurred, the risk of devaluation of the Thai currency
increased. However, the crisis did not occur immediately for many
reasons. First, the Thai government still largely remained in control of
the financial system. Second, most investors still believed that the Thai
government would continue pegging the exchange rate. As a result, no
profit could be gained from currency speculation. Third, the economy did
well at the beginning. Until 1991, Anand Panyarachun was the Prime
Minister of Thailand. He supported capitalism, decreased government
control over the market, and allowed funds to be transferred in and out of
the country more easily. (In the past, investors had to report to the Bank
of Thailand if they took funds in and out of the country) [United Nations].
Though his reforms were good for the Thai economy, it created an
opportunity for speculating because these investors did not have to report
to the Bank of Thailand. Moreover, Thai officials did not manage the
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policy effectively, allowing the Thai currency to be easily attacked by
speculators.
In 1996, the interest rate gap widened, and the Thai economy began
to deteriorate. These two reasons caused speculators to believe that the
value of the Thai baht was much lower than its current pegged rate. Both
foreign and domestic speculators hedged the exchange rate in large
volume. At the same time, the Thai government spent a total of around
$39 billion in forward swaps outstanding. Thus, foreign reserves were
really low. Because of low reserves, the Thai government was not able
to hold the exchange rate any longer. Hence, the Prime Minister, Chavalit
Yongjaiyut, decided to float the Thai currency on July 2, 1997.
2. Exchange Rates and Exports
As mentioned earlier, export growth declined due to increased
competition from other countries. But the pegged exchange rate policy
made the situation worse. Thai exports were a major source of growth as
they amounted to 35 to 40 percent of GDP from 1991 to 1996 [NYU
2005]. The high exchange rate made Thai products more expensive. As
a result, Thailand was at a disadvantage compared to its competitors such
as China.
B. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, BUSINESSES, AND REASONS
WHY BANK RUNS OCCURRED
1. Overinvestment
How can we know an overinvestment problem existed? Numbers in
Figures 7 and 8 can answer this question. The gross external debt growth
rate averaged 20.55% from 1987 to 1996. Growth happened largely in
short-term debt from banks and long-term private enterprises (See Figure
8). High growth in external debt occurred once in 1991, corresponding
with the beginning of the economic boom, and happened again in 1993 as
a result of the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) being
introduced in 1992. BIBF stimulated growth in foreign currency lending
[Radelet et al. 1998, 22]. Because external debt in these financial
institutions increased dramatically, that meant that there was high demand
for external debt from domestic investors. However, average GDP growth
was only 15.53% during the same period, indicating that the external debt
actually did not create value (Please note we must include a lag when
comparing the two variables; the debt should increase before GDP).

Figure 7. Comparison between debt and GDP growth
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Avg.

External debt grow th

1987
9.94%

1988
6.79%

1989
8.20%

19.61%

34.20%

10.82%

25.98%

24.50%

52.65%

12.79%

20.55%

nominal G D P grow th

17.26%

22.03%

17.16%

18.12%

15.10%

13.46%

12.16%

15.61%

16.17%

8.22%

15.53%

Sources: [N Y U 2005] These grow th rates calculated from external debt and nominal G D P in U S dollars.

Figure 8. External Debt Outstanding (Millions of US Dollars)
1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

6,947

E xternal D ebt
G eneral G overnm ent

5,226

5,536

5,112

3,951

4,177

4,107

4,312

4,819

4,876

5,152

6,051

Short-term

66

255

172

257

395

290

0

180

85

34

0

0

Long-term

5,160

5,281

4,940

3,694

3,782

3,817

4,312

4,639

4,791

5,118

6,051

6,947

M onetary A uthorities

973

672

275

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,157

11,204

Long-term

973

672

275

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

7,157

11,204

B anks 7/

1,526

2,484

3,158

4,233

4,477

6,263

13,019

27,976

41,939

41,869

39,221

28,322

Short-term

1,188

2,218

2,832

3,947

4,139

5,532

10,371

21,556

33,697

28,858

24,403

17,437

Long-term

338

266

326

286

338

731

2,648

6,420

8,242

13,011

14,818

10,885

O ther Sectors

12,294

12,372

14,305

21,123

29,224

33,251

34,776

32,072

54,017

61,721

56,847

58,589

Short-term

1,706

2,275

2,945

6,213

10,857

13,092

12,263

7,443

18,616

18,851

13,891

10,984

State Enterprises
Private Enterprises
Long-term
State Enterprises

0

1

0

0

310

260

0

0

0

20

20

150

1,706

2,274

2,945

6,213

10,547

12,832

12,263

7,443

18,616

18,831

13,871

10,834

10,588

10,097

11,360

14,910

18,367

20,159

22,513

24,629

35,401

42,870

42,956

47,605

7,751

7,081

6,720

7,563

8,323

,8701

9,859

10,896

11,526

11,629

10,854

13,277

Private Enterprises

2,837

3,016

4,640

7,347

10,044

11,458

12,654

13,733

23,875

31,241

32,102

34,328

G ross E xternal D ebt

20,019

21,064

22,850

29,308

37,878

43,621

52,107

64,867

100,832

108,742

109,276

105,062

5.22%

8.48%

28.26%

29.24%

15.16%

19.45%

24.49%

55.44%

7.84%

0.49%

-3.86%

Short-term

2,960

4,748

5,949

10,417

15,391

18,914

22,634

29,179

52,398

47,743

38,294

28,421

Long-term

17,059

16,316

16,901

18,891

22,487

24,707

29,473

35,688

48,434

60,999

70,982

76,641

Source: TD R I 2007
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In other words, the borrowed funds were not used solely for investment
purposes or, if they were, were for bad investments.
2. Investment and Financing Decisions
Investors must make capital budgeting decision to evaluate positive
net present value projects, including predicting the return on the assets.
After finding positive net present value projects, investors move on to
financing decisions, and look for the cheapest source of funds. When
making capital budgeting decisions, investors have to take overall
economic performance into consideration. Because the economy did so
well during the period, it is reasonable to believe returns would be high,
leading to a high number of new projects being approved. In addition, the
reasons for overinvestment mentioned by Vines and Warr in Section III
amplified the number of new projects. These led to an increase in needed
funds. According to The Thailand Development Research Institution
(TDRI), foreign and domestic investment increased dramatically (See
Figure 9 and 10). Because interest rates in the US were much lower than
interest rates in Thailand (See Figure 6), foreign loans were very
attractive. However, investors knew there was an exchange rate risk
associated with foreign loans. Therefore, they had two options. They
could borrow directly from foreign banks (and thus accept the exchange
rate risk), or they could borrow from a Thai financial institution at a
higher rate.1 According to Kumar and Debroy, because the government
pegged the exchange rate, most financial institutions did not hedge to
prevent exchange rate risk [1999, 5]. To reduce risk and because it was
more convenient to borrow money from domestic financial institutions,
most investors acquired funds from domestic financial institutions.
Because of a good economic outlook, the poor lending practices
mentioned by MacDonald, and the moral hazard problem mentioned by
Krugman in Section III, financial institutions lent out money easily
without adequate screening or assurance. According to Asian Economic
News, “the 300 million dollar loan for the financial markets, approved in
1997, underpins [the need for] fundamental reforms for transparency and
accountability in the financial sector” [1999]. While banks were
controlled by the Bank of Thailand, non-bank financial institutions could
make their own decisions without government supervision. Figure 11
shows that gross external debt outstanding increased gradually. In 1991,
gross external debt began to rise rapidly. Financial institutions were not
able to pay off their debts and the external debt outstanding began to rise.

Figure 9. Investment (millions of baht)2
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Total Investment
requested

59,688

208,949

530,826

461,503

524,751

250,498

213,023

278,745

594,592

901,384

833,818

490,828

224,595

Total Investment
approval

34,610

67,748

201,842

290,294

476,610

279,456

284,336

177,456

281,651

584,684

531,198

481,292

254,864

Source: TD R I 2007

Figure 10. Capital flows in Thailand (millions of baht)
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

C APITA L FLO W S

11,354

21,624

73,158

144,511

247,753

288,160

240,742

265,895

305,851

545,826

493,530

-161,971

-413,435

1. D irect Investment

6,880

4,712

27,883

45,869

61,624

47,110

49,980

39,810

21,935

29,422

35,597

109,737

300,162

2. Portfolio Investment
(Equity Securities)

2,517

12,862

11,185

36,658

11,507

928

11,512

67,851

-10,165

56,120

28,437

122,303

14,270

3. Loans

1,957

4,051

34,089

61,984

174,622

240,122

179,250

158,234

294,081

460,284

429,496

-394,011

-727,867

Source: TD R I 2007

Figure 11. Loans and external debt
1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Total Investment-loan approval
(millions of dollars)

8123.1

20986

1795

20510

9817

8386.7

11009

23642

36178

32902

G ross external debt outstanding
by financial institutions

13,820

14,856

17,463

25,356

33,701

39,514

47,795

60,048

95,956

103,590

96,068

1.70

0.71

0.97

1.24

3.43

4.71

4.34

2.54

2.65

3.15

6.14

R atio
Source: TD R I (2007) and N Y U (2005)

1997
1 5649.2
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3. What Happened After the Thai Currency Floated?
After the currency float, the Thai economy plunged down into deep
recession, causing many businesses to go bankrupt. Financial institutions
took the burden from both ends. First, businesses could not pay back
their debts either because their businesses did not perform well in the
recession, or because they were companies that should not have been lent
funds in the first place. As a result, non-performing loans (NPLs)
skyrocketed. For state-owned banks and financing companies, NPLs
made up more than 50% of their total loans (See Figure 12). Second,
external debt increased dramatically due to the devaluation of the Thai
currency, which made it really hard to pay back. However, instead of
letting the inefficient financial companies collapse, the government tried
to protect these companies for two reasons. First, the government
believed that letting the financial companies go bankrupt would send out
the message that Thailand was in big trouble, making Thailand
unattractive for investment and causing an even bigger recession.
Second, the client-patron relationship came into play. Executive
managers of the financial companies had connections to governors. Some
actually supported the governors financially. The Thai government spent
around $19.3 billion to prop up 91 failed financial institutions in 1996 and
early 1997 [Radelet 1998, 28n].
Figure 12. NPL Outstanding–Classified by Financial Institution Group
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Because the government used reserves to peg the exchange rate and
to support these financial institutions, Thailand’s debt to reserves ratio
was 1.453 [Radelet 1998, 15]. The low amount of reserves led to another
problem. After the investors and lenders realized that the Thai
government actually did not have the ability to insure all the short-term
debt, panic took place. Foreign investors rushed money out of the
country, creating a rapid capital flight. At the same time, lenders tried to
collect payments from these financial companies. Eventually, the
government could not support these institutions any longer. In December
1997, 56 financial institutions went bankrupt [Siamwalla 2001,21].
C. GOVERNMENT
There are two different points of view regarding government controls,
corruption, and macroeconomic mismanagement. While most researchers
believe that this was one of the main causes of the crisis, Joseph Stiglitz,
a Senior Vice President and Chief Economist at the World Bank,
expressed the opposite view. First, he claimed that economic growth had
been created by these so call “corrupted governments” in the past decade.
Second, macroeconomic policy in Thailand was not poor. Thailand’s
government surplus represented 2% of GDP in 1995, while the federal
surplus in the US made up less than 1% of GDP. The inflation rate was
lower in Thailand as well. Third, he thought, “claims about transparency
are just a form of blame shifting” [Stiglitz 1998, 1]. He said the lack of
transparency was known long before the crisis. He believed that Thailand
ranked about average and was considered above average among
developing countries [Stiglitz 1998, 1].
However, I strongly believe the Thai government was responsible for
the crisis from the beginning. Corruption was a real barrier to economic
success. As Robert Lees3 suggested:
When the outcomes of business transactions are being
determined by bribery, influence-peddling and favoritism, rather
than by sound business decisions and market forces, the entire
economy pays a price.
Corruption exacts a heavy penalty on every segment of
society — laborer and business owner, public official and private
citizen. It acts very much like a tax on public projects, adding,
according to some estimates, as much as 30 percent to the cost.
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The Asian Development Bank has calculated that corruption
can cost governments as much as 50 percent of their tax revenues
and can amount to more than a country's total foreign debt.
[1998, para. 4-6]

In this section, I present the idea that the Thai government created a too
politicized business environment, inefficient macroeconomic and
monetary policies, corruption and inefficient laws.
1. Overview and Perception of the Thai Government
Transparency International ranks countries by using the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI). The index represented opinions from various
business people, especially from those who engage in multinational
business. The index is from 1 to 10, with 10 representing a clean country.
Thailand’s CPI ranking was 1.85 from 1988 to 1992 and increased to 3.33
from 1993 to 1996 [Lambdorff 1996]. Many people believe the
difference can be credited in large part to Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun, widely regarded as one of Thailand’s cleanest Prime
Ministers. He was appointed Prime Minister after a military coup in
1991.4 He promoted “a more transparent and accountable system of
governance in Thailand” [United Nations, para. 16]. However, the
country’s CPI ranking of 3.33 still put Thailand near the bottom of the
list. The CPI ranking showed that business people believed the Thai
government was still very corrupt.
As Stiglitz claimed, corruption in Thailand was prevalent before the
crisis, but the Thai economy was still growing. Therefore, corruption
must not have contributed to the crisis. Occasional corruption probably
did not hurt Thailand all that much. During the economic boom, there was
enough money to go around. However, when corruption evolved into a
collective long-term problem, it may have hurt the country. In 1996,
economic growth started to slow down. The total budget available was
getting smaller, while the money going out of the door was still the same.
The imbalance definitely could have caused problems. Moreover, instead
of focusing on solving recessions, politicians were more interested in
helping their own businesses or the businesses of friends. Politicians
were using money or manipulating policies to protect their businesses
instead of protecting the interests of the country. All in all, corruption
may have easily turned from normal activities to a main cause of the
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crisis. 5
Stiglitz also claimed Thailand’s corruption was about average,
referencing their rank in the CPI index in 1995. However, most of the
countries ranked below Thailand (India, the Philippines, Brazil,
Venezuela, Pakistan, China, and Indonesia) underwent a deep recession
in the 1990’s. The theory of high corruption leading Thailand into
recession could be legitimate.
Furthermore, from 1991 to 1997, two out of three prime ministers
resigned due to outrageous corruption in the cabinet. Though this
corruption was widely known to the Thai people, most of the politicians
easily evaded prosecution.
2. Corruption and Bad Policies
First, due to a highly politicized environment, the government had
some control over the Bank of Thailand and its decisions. Before 1997,
there were crises around the world, such as in Mexico and Argentina
(1994-1995) which were caused by pegged exchange rates. Should the
examples of Mexico and Argentina have signaled the Thai government to
stop pegging the exchange rate? Decisions regarding the exchange rate
in Thailand were made by the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance,
and the President of the Bank of Thailand. However, there were many
governors with supporters who owned businesses in Thailand. Letting the
baht float would have cost them tremendously. Floating the currency was
not a popular policy, which meant it could affect the next election.
Second, as previously discussed, the client-patron relationship helped
prop-up troubled financial institutions. There was an investigation
regarding this, but there was not enough solid evidence to take governors
or officials to trial. Even if no corruption was involved, propping up bad
financial institutions was a sign of bad policy. The government was
afraid that if one financial institution failed, panic might occur. Instead,
the government tried to cover up the truth. Eventually, the naïve policy
led to a series of bank runs.
Politicians made a profit from every financial decision that was made.
Allowing the baht to float may have created a profit of more than one
billion bahts for Deputy Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. According
to unsettled civil case 3269/47, Rerngchai Malaganon, the President of
the Bank of Thailand at the time, testified that PM Chavalit Yongjaiyut
let Pokin Polakul, Minister of the Prime Minister’s office, illegally
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remained present at the exchange rate meeting.6
3. Inefficient Laws
Thailand has a law regarding basic corruption cases. For instance,
Section 13 of the Corruption Act states that the Commission of Counter
Corruption (CCC), founded in 1974, can order “any governmental office,
state agency or state enterprise be required to instruct any state official
attached there to, who has been suspected of corruption, to declare his
assets and liabilities in accordance with such particulars, procedure and
within such time as the Council thinks fit [Damrongchai, 1-2].” However,
many politicians transferred corrupt money to others’ accounts. As a
result, it was hard to prove which politicians were corrupt.
The worst part of constitutional law is in the area of business. Most
of the cases were examined using criminal law. Thailand does not have
any specific law regarding corporate governance, and it is impossible to
have everything written down Thai law seems to play catch up with
creative unethical behaviors of business people in order to create more
profits. This makes it really hard to prevent unethical business activities.
Moreover, most judges in Thailand lack understanding of business
practice.7 Those who are knowledgeable in business law are usually hired
by businesses to help find loopholes in the law in order to get away with
unethical practices. Moreover, according to Simon et al., corporate
governance problems such as looting of firms by controlling shareholders,
the transferring out of assets to avoid paying creditors, and the propping
up using loan guarantees by other listed group members, were part of the
Asian Crisis. Statue law did not prevent these activities as well as
common law, and countries whose legal system prevented such activities
faced milder crises in 1997 [2000, 22].
All in all, inefficient laws cost Thailand tremendously. Politicians
could easily get away with corruption and business people operated their
businesses the way they wanted. Both led to problems such as inefficient
markets, overinvestment, and money laundering, all of which contributed
to the crisis in 1997.

V. Changes After the Crisis
A. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
The floatation of the Thai currency on July 2nd , 1997 was not only the
starting point of the Asian crisis, but also eventually led to more efficient
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markets in Thailand. First, it helped correct the prices of export goods,
which helped the real value of exports increase by 21% in 1997 in
comparison to a 5% decrease the year before8 [TDRI 2007]. Second, it
supported businesses in Thailand. When the currency was pegged,
products from abroad were cheaper than what they were supposed to be,
so Thai people bought more foreign products. After the floatation,
products manufactured in Thailand were cheaper in comparison to foreign
products. Consequently, Thai people bought more domestic products,
which helped support Thai businesses and decrease the trade deficit.
Moreover, the Thai government could use the budget in a way that
benefitted Thailand more. As mentioned before, Thailand used a total of
$39 billion from late 1996 to early 1997 to peg the exchange rate. If the
currency had floated, it not only would have helped increase the
credibility of the financial system, but the money could have been used
to help the Thai economy through investments, improved infrastructure,
and research and development.
B. LEGAL REFORM
There were two significant changes in the law.
First, Thailand
implemented a new constitution on October 11th, 1997, known as the
“people’s constitution”. The gist of the constitution was to reduce the
power of politicians and shift power to the Thai people, which
represented a new level of democracy in Thailand. With the new
constitution, 200 senators and 500 members of the House of
Representatives were elected. Voting became mandatory for Thai citizens
[Punyaratabandhu 1998]. One more interesting change can be found in
chapter 10 of the Thai constitution. This chapter concerns government
officials. The chapter has four sections:
(1) Declaration of Accounts showing Particulars of Assets and
Liabilities: This section requires high level government and political
officials to present their net assets to the National Counter Corruption
Commission whenever taking or vacating an office.
(2) The National Counter Corruption Commission: This section states the
responsibilities and defines membership of the National Counter
Corruption Commission.
(3) Removal from Office: This section elaborates procedures of
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investigation and removal of both politicians and high level
government officials in the case of corruption and malfeasance in
office.
(4) Criminal Proceedings Against Persons Holding Political Positions:
This section includes procedures and the responsibilities of the
Supreme Court of Justice's Criminal Division for Persons Holding
Political Positions, which holds trials for political officials who are
accused of corruption or malfeasance. [Thai Constitution 1997,
Chapter 10 Section 291 to 311]
There were also three new courts and commissions founded by the new
constitution: the Constitution Court, the National Human Rights
Commission, and the office of the Ombudsman [Punyaratabandhu 1998].
All in all, the new constitution put an emphasis on preventing corruption
from all officers in various shapes and forms. The constitution gave more
freedom to the media to do its job in hopes the media would help monitor
activities in the Thai government [Friedman 1999, para. 6].
A second major legal reform occurred in Thailand. Major changes in
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws helped to promote efficiency. This led
to the establishment of a Central Bankruptcy Court, the introduction of a
rehabilitative procedure, and the change in foreclosure procedures in
order to prevent delay [Siamwalla 2001, 36].10
C. THE BANK OF THAILAND
The Bank of Thailand founded the Corporate Debt Restructuring
Advisory Committee (CDRAC) in June 1998. “Corporate Debt
Restructuring aims to support continuing economic recovery by enabling
viable debtors to continue business operations and promoting fair and
equitable debt repayment to creditors” [BOT 2000]. CDRAC helped
debtors restructure their debts and acted like an arbitrator between debtors
and creditors during negotiations. Not only did restructuring help save
many businesses from failure, but the CDRAC also coordinated with the
Revenue Department and the Land Department to help creditors receive
tax deductions to compensate them from losses that might have occurred
from debt restructuring. CDRAC helped a total of 702 companies with
total credit outstanding of 1.5 trillion bahts [BOT 2000].
One big improvement in the Bank of Thailand, which actually came
from an IMF program, was an increase in transparency in releasing key
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data [Sussangkarn 1999, 9]. The increase in transparency helped
investors act more reasonably to current economic situations.
D. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
After the resignation of PM Chavalit Yongjaiyut, Chuan Leekpai was
elected Prime Minister of Thailand in Nov 1997. The PM and the
Minister of Finance, Tarrin Nimmanhaemmind, believed the quality of
the balance sheets for both financial institutions and corporations were
parts of the problems. Cleaning up the balance sheets became part of his
policies, leading to reform in the accounting profession. The Thai
General Accepted Accounting Practice Standards (GAAP) was founded
to prevent bad accounting practices in businesses [Siamwalla 2001, 37].
After Chuan was defeated in the election of Jan 2001, Thaksin
Shinawatra became Prime Minister. Thaksin took a different approach to
solve NPL problems. He formed the Thai Asset Management
Corporation (TAMC). Thaksin noticed old regulations followed in
Chuan’s government were not fast enough given the amount of debts
banks had. TAMC’s policy was to maximize value of the assets,
minimize the state’s and taxpayers’ loss, and help revive high-NPL
companies. TAMC took over all NPL portfolios for both state and private
banks, restructured all the debts, and paid back debtors in the form of
non-transferable, ten-year, FIDF-guaranteed (Financial Institutions
Development Fund) bonds [Siamwalla 2001, 39-40], [TAMC].

VI. Has Thailand Learned from the Asian Crisis?
Thailand has made various attempts to recover from the crisis, create
long-term economic growth, and prevent future crises. However, there
are many problems that have not been solved. Additionally, the
government could have done many things to enhance the Thai economy.
In this Section, current situations are used to illustrate Thailand’s
problems. Then, suggestions of what Thailand could have done
differently to achieve its goals are included.
A. CURRENT PROBLEMS
Since the crisis, Thailand has seen four prime ministers and one military
coup. Political instability made it hard for Thailand to move forward.
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Corruption and policy inconsistency among the various governments had
negative effects on the Thai economy. Corruption also led to political
pressures in policies created by the Bank of Thailand, which does not
have full independence to make decisions. In the following paragraphs,
various problems with each government since 1997 are demonstrated,
including direct corruption, indirect corruption, political instability, and
problematic policies.
There were corruption scandals in each of the Thai administrations.
During PM Chuan Leekpai’s tenure (1997 - 2001), most forms of
corruption occurred directly in the form of bribery. Two of his cabinet
members, Rakkiat Sukthana and Sanan Kajornprasart, were accused of
corruption.11 These two cases illustrate some of the success the new
constitution of 1997 has had on corruption.
During PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s reign, corruption was more indirect.
PM Thaksin is a businessman and is considered one of the richest people
in the country.12 According to the study by Phasuk Pongphaichit, a
lecturer at Chulalongkorn University (the most well known university in
Thailand), both the Prime Minister and his cabinet members indirectly
incorporated corruption through policies that supported their businesses
by granting business privileges, reducing taxes and concession fees, and
getting rid of business rivals. Phasuk mentioned 13 different cases
showing corrupt policies that helped Thaksin’s own businesses.
Moreover, Phasuk mentioned more than 20 cases related to businesses
owned by his cabinet members [The Nation 2006].13 Though many of
these cases were known by the Thai people, only one of the thirteen cases
related to Thaksin’s businesses reached the Supreme Court.14 As a result,
questions have been raised asking why the National Counter Corruption
Commission, which has the responsibility to monitor corruption, did not
investigate these cases and send them through the judicial process. To
summarize, from 2001 to 2006, the Prime Minister and his cabinet
members enjoyed great benefits from corruption by manipulating
economic policies to favor their businesses at the expense of other
businesses in the same industries and the country as a whole.
Individual leaders have their own thoughts and ideas. Therefore, it
is normal to expect policies to differ from administration to
administration. However, within an 11 year period, Thailand has changed
government administrations four times. The largest policy change
occurred between the Thaksin Shinawatra and Surayud Chulanont
administrations. Surayud, who was the PM after the coup, had a more
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conservative administration than Thaksin. Therefore, many policies
created during Thaksin’s government were reversed. For example, in
Surayud’s regime, foreign investors were required to deposit 30% of all
money invested in Thailand with the Bank of Thailand in no interest
accounts. This restricted foreign ownership policy reflected the belief
that businesses in specific industries should be controlled by Thai
owners15 [Lopez 2007]. As a result, political and policy instability caused
investors to perceive Thailand as a risky market, which may have caused
a decrease in long term investment.
The current Prime Minister, Samak Sundaravej, was sworn into the
office on 7 February 2008. Samak is the Prime Minister only in name
while Thaksin is the power behind him. Samak has already started to
reverse some policies created by the prior administration. On 3 March
2008, he reduced the 30% required reserves from foreign investors to 0%
[The Government Public Relations Department 2008]. On 10 February
2008, the Minister of Commerce, Mingkwan Sangsuwan, introduced the
first popular policy to reduce the prices of 33 “necessary” products,
including cars and cell phone service [Thairath 2008]. To reduce prices,
the government will either force businesses to reduce the price or
intervene in the market with government subsidies. Subsidies cause
market distortions and may create a higher government deficit. Dr.
Surapong Suebwonglee, M.D., was chosen to be the new Minister of
Finance. It is hard to say how good he will be in this position. While
certainly educated, Dr Surapong has little or no experience in
macroeconomics, and there are a lot of alternate experts with
macroeconomic experience. These experts would be reluctant to take the
job because of the Thai law. The law says that a minister shall not engage
in any private businesses that are under the control of the minister. This
will remain in effect until 2 years after one is out of the position16 [Thai
Government Gazette 2001, 147-148]. As a result, no one who is
knowledgeable in this field wants to hold the position.
While there have been various attempts to prevent corruption, there
is still significant corruption in Thailand. Policies have been made that
are beneficial to a group of people instead of to the country as a whole.
Moreover, a lack of stability in policies and politics has exacerbated the
problems. This instability may also be decreasing confidence among
investors wishing to invest their money in Thailand. If the problems are
not solved, it will not be a surprise if the crisis happens again in Thailand.
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B. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Thailand has been trying to respond to problems rather than trying to
prevent future crises. Both the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory
Committee (CDRAC) and the Thai Asset Management Corporation
(TAMC) are examples of the problem. Ten years after the crisis, CDRAC
and TAMC still help bad businesses and financial institutions clean up
their mess. It is time for the government to let go of these companies and
let them face the consequences associated with bad judgment. This will
encourage businesses to be more cautious and make better decisions,
which should help decrease the number of poor investments.
In terms of government, Thailand should be the first priority of
politicians, not their own businesses or reputations. Policies that are
created to win popularity for a particular party have to stop, and the
government should put more emphasis on macroeconomics. It is
impossible to get rid of all corruption; however, it should be minimized,
especially in obvious cases. Thai politicians can too easily avoid taking
responsibility for their actions. Thai law has improved, and it should be
used more effectively to counteract unethical actions. Moreover, the law
should not discourage qualified individuals from accepting positions.
It would be best if Thailand could separate macroeconomic policies
from politics. The Thai government currently has too much control over
the central bank. For instance, the Minister of Finance can make changes
in policies created by the Bank of Thailand, and he can hire or fire the
president of the Bank of Thailand. Independence will not only create
consistency, but it will also create policies that appeal to the interest of
the Thai people, and not the interests of select groups. According to
Barro, “studies of the major developed countries show that a less
independent central bank tends to deliver higher and more variable
inflation” [Barro 1996, 56]. While a less independent central bank tends
to inflate the economy during a recession due to political pressure, an
independent central bank commits to price stability and keeps inflation
under control. High inflation may lead to better economic performance
during a recession, but it can be very dangerous to the economy in the
long run. Hence, “a move to a more independent central bank appears to
be all gain and no pain” [Barro 1996, 57]. Independence for the Bank of
Thailand to make decisions in terms of monetary and macroeconomic
policies will be very beneficial to the Thai economy in the long run. It
will help create stability in the Thai economy. Moreover, individuals who

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2008

59

work for the central bank have to commit to price stability and control
inflation. Without these individuals, independence given to the central
bank will be less meaningful [Barro 1996, 58].

VII. Conclusion
The paper started by introducing the economic situation in Thailand
before and after the crisis. Then, causes were discussed. Studies done by
various researchers were used to guide my analysis. In my analysis, I
conclude that the three main components of the Asian crisis were
exchange rate policy, mismanaged financial institutions, and the
government. After the crisis, the Thai government spent lots of time
cleaning up the mess that caused the crises. There were legal reforms and
new government organizations created in order to help solve the problems
and prevent them from reoccurring in the future. Some of the changes,
such as increasing transparency in releasing key data from the Bank of
Thailand, were very helpful to the Thai economy. However, many of
them were neither successful nor effective enough to solve a problem as
big as corruption. The ineffectiveness of the reform is evident, as
corruption remains a major problem in Thailand today. Many policies
served temporary purposes and merely postponed the real problems for
future administrations to solve. In a sense, Thailand is back to where it
is started.
All in all, Thailand seems to move around in a circle it can never
break out of. In order for Thailand to experience long run economic
growth, it is necessary to encourage better corporate governance in
financial institutions and businesses, reduce corruption, enhance
macroeconomic policies, and give independence to the Bank of Thailand.
If all these goals are reached, Thailand can be an economic leader in Asia.
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Endnotes
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Note that many non-bank financial institutions lent at a lower rate than the normal
interest rate in Thailand because they borrowed money from abroad and competed
with other companies in order to be the top financial institutions.
Low investment in 1991 was due to political instability.
Robert Lees is a secretary-general of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, an
association of senior business leaders representing more than 1,100 companies in 20
nations.
From 1980 to 1991, all the Prime Ministers were from the military. There were many
military coups during that period. Thailand was nominally a democracy, but military
coups showed the weaknesses of Thai democracy.
During the early 1990s, economic growth was largely in industrial and service
sectors, which mainly include high and middle income people. At the same time,
income inequality in the agricultural sector, with 51% of the total labor force,
increased [Motonishi 2003, 2]. Thus, economic growth does not always bring good
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6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
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fortune to everybody. Without corruption, more money is available to spend for the
poor during the high growth period (It can be in terms of better infrastructure or
creating more opportunity for the poor to get education and proper health care).
When corruption occurred either directly or through policy, it mainly hurts poor
people the most. It transfers money that can be used to help the majority of people
to a specific group of people. Thus, it worsens income inequality, which can have a
negative effect on Thailand in the long run.
Pokin Polakun also held the position from 2001 to 2006 when Thaksin Shinawatra
was the Prime Minister.
In Thailand, law school can be attended by undergraduates, so most judges have no
background in business, which makes it hard to understand malpractice in business
world.
Using 1986 as a base year for calculation, 21% was the highest growth since 1990.
In the past, 270 senators were appointed. The new constitution also increased the
number in the House of Representatives from 360 to 500, 400 of which were elected
as district representatives and 100 of which were from party lists.
Before the reform, the law favored corporate debtors. A plaintiff had to prove that
the company ha a negative balance before the court can declare bankruptcy. Many
companies can easily get away without paying back loans on time. However,
declaring bankruptcy as a person was more threatening since creditors could claim
the debtor’s belongings. The biggest drawback of the old law was the speed of the
procedure. For example, a foreclosure procure could take three to five years.
[Siamwala 2001, 36]
Rakkiat Sukthana, the Health Minister, was accused of accepting bribes from a
pharmaceutical firm and letting the firm win a bid arranged by the Health Ministry.
He ended up serving time in jail and some of his assets were confiscated. Also,
Sanan Kajornprasart, the Interior Minister, was found guilty of failing to declare all
of his assets. He was barred by the Constitution Court from politics for 5 years;
however, no further investigation was conducted to find out why the assets were
hidden.
Statistically, Thaksin was not ranked the richest. However, before he became the
PM, he transferred most of his assets to his children, his wife, his relatives, and even
servants at his house holding Shin Corp stocks, Thaksin’s company. According to
a Money & Banking Magazine survey, one of his daughters, who was still in school,
was the richest person in Thailand in 2004 and 2005 with assets of 19 billion bahts.
His brother-in-law took second place, and his son took fourth place. Not to mention
that there were more relatives who were on the list [The Nation 2005]. Moreover, his
cabinet members’ families also ranked among the richest families in Thailand, which
include the Mahakijsiri family, the Jungrungreangkit family, the Maleenon family,
the Chearavanon familiy, and the Asavabhokin family [The Nation 2006].
One example of these cases mentioned by Phasuk was “the exemption of Shin
Satellite (Thaksin’s business) from paying taxes on its revenue worth Bt16.349
billion generated from its foreign customers of its IP Star satellite was unjustifiable.
This is because the exemption did not lead to any investment in Thailand and Thai
people did not receive any benefit. Only the foreign customers and share holders of
Shin Satellite received the benefits” [The Nation 2006]. The other popular case was
selling 49.6% shares (He changed the policy that foreign investors can own less than
50% instead of less than 35%) of Shin Corp to Temasek, a Singaporean state-owned
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company, at $1.9 billion without having to pay tax. This could also affect national
secuirty since Shin Corp is a telecommunication company. However, this deal was
not successful because a riot broke out, and Temasek eventually decided to sell those
shares back to Thaksin [Straits Times 2006].
14. These cases are judged in the Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political
Positions of the Supreme Court.
15. This was likely created because of the Shin Corp and Temasek scandals referenced
in footnote 13.
16. This law is stated in the Thai Government Gazette by the National Counter
Corruption Commission.

